

Framing environmental transitions.



How policy actors perceive social-ecological interdependencies?

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Grenoble Ecole de Management

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Considering perceptions for transition

System thinking & interdependencies

- social-ecological systems, co-evolution (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010; Ostrom, 2009)
- institutional complementarities (Amable, 2016; Aoki, 2011; Bolognesi and Nahrath, 2020)

Policy process and organization

- integration VS specialization (Ingold et al., 2019; Morrison, 2017; Trein et al., 2021)
- coalitions and collaboration (Kim et al., 2022; Weible and Sabatier, 2009)
- agenda setting (Fronzel et al., 2017; Mathias et al., 2020)

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The Hows & Whys of interdependencies perception

1 Nature

2 Determinants

3 Policy

3 sets of hypotheses

Limited perceptions of interdependencies & variations
(H1)

1 scope

2 intensity

3 polarization

3 sets of hypotheses

Limited perceptions of interdependencies & variations (H1)

1 scope

2 intensity

3 polarization

Drivers of perception (H2)

- 1 knowledge in env. disciplines (\neq) scope & intensity
- 2 level of education (+) on scope, (-) on polarization
- 3 sensitive to environment (+) on scope
- 4 age (-) on scope & intensity
- 5 environmental uses (+) on scope & intensity

3 sets of hypotheses


Limited perceptions of interdependencies & variations
(H1)

Drivers of perception (H2)

Perception intensity \neq policy preferences (H3)

- 1 (+) wider participation, if env. use (i.e., asso, citizens...)
- 2 (+) state intervention
- 3 (+) precautionary principle, if env. uses
- 4 (+) stringent instruments

Data & Methods



19 water uses

1/Habitat	2/ Biodiversity	3/ Hydrological cycle
4/Sediments	6/ Industrial	7/ Drinking water
8/Irrigation	9/ Discharge	10/ Refreshment
11/Leisure	12/ Bathing	13/ Fishing
14/Drainage	14/ Hydroelectricity	15/ Commercial navigation
16/ Nautism	17/Hydrothermal power	18/Fire
19/ Protection against water-related damages		

Data & case

Case

- Water Geneva state
- 19 Water uses
- 342 relations

Survey on interdependencies perceptions

- ask impact of x-use on y-use (Likert scale)
- sent to 265 key stakeholders (70)
- use 74 respondents
- N= 25,270 relations

Data & case

Case

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3 dimensions

- Perception= $p(\text{resp.})$
- Intensity= mean resp.
- Polarization= sd resp.

Survey on interdependencies perceptions

- ask impact of x-use on y-use (Likert scale)
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Explanatory variables

- H2: disciplinary expertise, education, age, freq to water, affiliation
- H3: Policy pref for participation, instruments

Empirical strategy

Limited perceptions of interdependencies (H1)

descriptive statistics

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descriptive statistics

Drivers (H2)

→ outcomes: prob, intensity, polarization

$$\text{Perception}_{i,j,r} = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{expertise}_r + \beta_2 \cdot \text{individuals}_r + \beta_3 \cdot \text{uses}_{i,j} + \text{controls}_{i,j,r} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Empirical strategy

Limited perceptions of interdependencies (H1)

descriptive statistics

Drivers (H2)

→ outcomes: prob, intensity, polarization

$$Perception_{i,j,r} = \alpha + \beta_1.expertise_r + \beta_2.individuals_r + \beta_3.uses_{i,j} + controls_{i,j,r} + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

Perception ≠ policy (H3)

→ outcomes: participation & instruments

$$Pref_{i,j,r} = \alpha + \beta_1.intensity_{i,j,r} + \beta_2.env_i + \beta_3.env_i \times intensity_{i,j,r} \quad (2)$$

$$+ \beta_4.env_j + \beta_5.env_j \times intensity_{i,j,r} + \beta_6.env_i \times env_j$$

$$+ \beta_7.env_i \times env_j \times intensity_{i,j,r} + controls_{i,j,r} + \epsilon$$

Controls

actors groups, survey structure, SD clustered at actors level





Figure 1: Survey structure and response rate


Results

Variations of perceptions (H.1)


Perceived interdependencies




Interdependencies




Polarization



Variations of perceptions (H.1)



Variations of perceptions (H.1)



Determinants of perceptions (H.2)

	Perception	Intensity	Polarization
Expertise			
social	0.0932**	-0.0144	-0.00553
environment	-0.0405	0.0292*	0.0249
Individuals			
age	0.00533	-0.00451	-0.00483
education	0.344**	-0.209*	-0.208*
Frequency water	0.807***	-0.118	-0.117
Affiliation (base = other)			
Political	0.932	1.212**	1.174**
Professional	0.171	1.063***	0.974***
Environmental uses			
receptor	0.216***	1.304***	0.0633
source	0.413***	0.766***	-0.00564
Observations	21 660	11 163	11 163
Pseudo R2	0.166		
R-squared		0.265	0.092

Controls: groups, survey structure, SE clustered at respondent level

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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Perception and participation preferences (H.3)

	(1) Mun.	(2) Rgl	(3) Ntl	(4) PPP	(5) Private	(6) Asso	(7) Citiz
intensity	-0.02	-0.04	0	0.02	0.08	0.08	-0.01
Environment							
recept	-0.34	0.35*	-0.29	0.07	-0.09	-0.16	-0.49**
recept \times int	0.11	-0.05	0.09	-0.01	-0	0.03	0.14**
source	-0.13	0.33	-0.35*	0.04	0.06	-0.31*	-0.48**
source \times int	0.05	-0.03	0.13**	0.01	-0.04	0.13**	0.17***
recept \times so	-0.06	-1.26**	-0	-0.2	0.1	-0.45	-0.55
recept \times so \times int	-0.02	0.25*	-0.06	0.04	0	0.07	0.06
<i>N</i>	10875	10551	10551	10367	10387	10471	10482
<i>R</i> ²	0.26	0.47	0.19	0.23	0.33	0.3	0.32

Controls determinants (H2), groups, survey structure, SE clustered at respondent level

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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recept \times int	0.11	-0.05	0.09	-0.01	-0	0.03	0.14**
source	-0.13	0.33	-0.35*	0.04	0.06	-0.31*	-0.48**
source \times int	0.05	-0.03	0.13**	0.01	-0.04	0.13**	0.17***
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Perception and policy instruments preferences (H.3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	subs	tax	mkt	info_use	info_res	ban	precaution
intensity	-0.01	-0.05	0.06	0.1	0.13*	0.06	-0.06
Environment							
recept	-0.08	-0.08	-0.33	-0.32	-0.47*	-0.27	-0.28
recept × int	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.12*
source	0.16	0.03	-0.27	-0.21	-0.29	-0.43*	-0.29*
source × int	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.12**	0.14**
recept × so	-0.71	-0.02	0.49	-0.93*	-1.26*	0.04	-1.05**
recept × so × int	0.15	-0.03	-0.15	0.2	0.27*	-0.03	0.2*
N	10470	10470	10153	10530	10530	10477	10530
R^2	0.24	0.22	0.16	0.25	0.24	0.27	0.20

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Variations & significance of interdependencies perceptions

- by uses & dimensions
- ex: intensity \circ env & polarization \circ infrastructure

Determinants vary across dimensions

- usual suspects OK
- knowledge & sensitivity to env.

Perceptions associate w/ pol. preferences

- interesting results
- surprise: information
- identification strat.

Framing environmental transitions.



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G-EAU, Montpellier, 19 mai 2023

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